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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
------ -------- ----- - x 
PHILIP SELDON, 
Plaintiff, REPORT & RECOMMENDATION 
against- 11 Civ. 6218 (PAC) (MHD) 
EDWARD MAGEDSON a/k/a ED MAGEDSON, 
RIPOFFREPORT.COM, and XCENTRIC 
VENTURES L.L.C., 
Defendants. 
TO THE HONORABLE PAUL A. CROTTY, 
Plaintiff Philip Seldon, a citizen of New York, filed this 
diversity action pro se on September 6, 2011, asserting common-law 
claims defamation and breach of contract. On November 7, 2011, 
plaintiff filed an amended complaint as a matter of course in 
response to defendants' first motion to dismiss, asserting claims 
substantially similar to those alleged in the original complaint. 
He alleges that defendants Edward Magedson ("Magedson") and 
Xcent c Ventures, LLC ("Xcentric" ) knowingly posted false and 
defamatory comments on their website, which is titl 
ripoffreport.com. Seldon further alleges that Magedson failed to 
perform certain reputation repair services for which he and 
Magedson had contracted. He seeks compensatory and punitive damages 
as well as specific performance of the alleged contract. 
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I 
Defendants move to dismiss this action for lack of personal 
jurisdiction. They also assert that plaintiffts defamation claims 
and part of his contract claim are barred by the Communications 
Decency Act (the "CDAtt) 47 U. S . C . § 230 ~t and thatt 
plaintiff S remaining contract claim is either barred by thet 
Statute of Frauds or cannot be heard for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction. For the reasons set forth below t we recommend that 
defendants t motion to dismiss be granted based on the lack of 
personal jurisdiction over defendants. If the district court finds 
that the exercise of jurisdiction over defendants is propert we 
recommend that the court grant defendants t motion to dismiss 
plaintiffts defamation claims and part of his contract claim as 
barred by the CDA t but deny their motion with respect to the 
remaining contract claim. 
BACKGROUND 
Defendant Xcentric t an Arizona limited liability companYt owns 
a website known as ripoffreport.com. 1 (Am. Compl. ~ 4). Defendant 
The domicile of an LLC is based solely on the citizenship of 
its members. Quantlab Fin., LLC, Quantlab Techs. Ltd. (BVI) v. 
Tower Research Capital, LLC t 715 F. Supp.2d 542 t 546 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010) (quoting t inter alia t Handelsman v. Bedford ViII. Assocs. 
Ltd. ptshipt 213 F.3d 48 t 51-52 (2d Cir. 2000}). Neither party 
provides the citizenship of Xcent cts members. Plaintiff 
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Magedson, also a citizen of Arizona, is the manager of Xcentric and 
runs the website's day-to day operations. (Decl. of Edward Magedson 
in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss ("Magedson Decl.") • 2; PI.'s 
Affirmation in Opp' n to Motion to Dismiss Am. Complo ("PI. 's 
Affirmation") , 8). The website functions as a free message board 
where consumers can post comments regarding companies' business 
practices. (See Magedson Decl. " 4-5) . 
According to the complaint, Seldon found himself the subject 
of unflattering posts by several users of the site Irina 
Borisenko and one or more patrons who identified themselves only as 
"Mike," "Doctor," and "Employee." (Am. Compl. ,,8, 11,18,25,32, 
39, 46). The posts accused plaintiff of various misdeeds ranging 
from sexual harassment to fraud and tax evasion. (~, 
" 32, 
39) .2 Seldon leges that he spoke with Magedson, who agreed 
describes the LLC as "located in the State of Arizona." (Am. 
Compl. , 5). Magedson confirms that Xcentric is organized under 
the laws of Arizona and does business there. (Magedson Decl. " 
8-9). However, ther party disputes that defendants are solely 
Arizona citizens for diversity-jurisdiction purposes. Thus, we 
assume that that is the case for purposes of the present motion. 
2 The text of the posts, copied in the order in which plaintiff 
presents them: 
1. An April 25, 2011 post by "Irina" titled "Sexual Pervert:" 
"Philip Seldon took nasty photos of me when he got me drunk 
as his roommate and then told me he deleted the photos. I found 
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out that he didn't delete them and had multiple copies that he 
kept on his business computer and personal computer. He had 
multiple photos of me printed out in file cabinets. I asked him 
why he didn't delete the photos and he said he forgot but now 
wishes to distribute them to people and sell them back to me. 
This man has all kinds of perverted photos on his computer and is 
a menace to women. He tells lies and is obsessed with stalking 
me. I've issued a warning to him to stay away from me but he 
continues to harass my family and friends. Nobody took any money 
from me and all that he says is I . He tries to control my 
money and family but I tell him to leave me alone. He won't 
listen and I am afraid of him. I will notify the police that he 
is still bothering me." (Am. CompI. ~ 18). Note that this post 
underlies plaintiff's first and second defamation claims. 
id. ~~ 11, 18). 
2. 	An April 25, 2011 post by "Mike:" 
"Seldon has many judgements [sic] against him and is 
currently using corporate shell companies to avoid a judgement 
[sic] against him already approved by the courts. Check New 
Jersey and NYC court records. If you have information regarding 
this person, please contact Andrew Spinnel, attorneyl [sic] in 
NYC so justice can be served." (Id. ~ 25). 
3. An April 25, 2011 post by "Doctor," titled "Tax Free Money 
Income:" 
"Philip Seldon hosts wine tasting parties (200-500 people) 
and takes in cash and never reports it as income to the Federal 
Government. Philip Seldon gets Federal Express packages and 
express mail or UPS packages with aproximaely [sic] $11,000 per 
month cash contents at his home and business address (same 
building apartment #2724 and #3414) from a woman named Kathy 
whose [sic] one of his other companies is located in Oklahoma 
where Kathy hides his money under a corporate veil (hence his 
name Norman Oklahoma). Monthly wine tastings are held in NYC 
under another one of his company names and he is avoiding NYC 
City taxes as well. Go visit one of his wine tastings all of you 
prosecutors, 's usually held at the Bulgarian National Hall on 
the Upper East [Slide so a sting operation would be good for your 
public relations. His old ro[om]mate Leslie has a paypal account 
that she launders the money for Philip monthly from events and 
Kathy so he can avoid creditors and not pay Federal, State, and 
City taxes. Philip Seldon has a stock trading account that he 
trades approximately $400,000 worth of stock registered under the 
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to contact the authors of the posts in order to substantiate their 
claims. (rd. ~ 8). Magedson allegedly agreed, among other things, 
corporate veil of Kathy's company in Oklahoma and he is the only 
person trading this stock and asset. He only buys and sells Apple 
Corporation stock so it won't be hard to catch him on the 
corporate veil corruption he so readily sets up. Philip takes 
naked pictures of his ex-ro[om]mates (always women) and tries to 
hold them over the head[s] for favors and promises of future 
friendship. Philip[']s mot is to usually get women drunk at 
lavish wine tastings and home/office dinners and then to get 
women to take of[f] their clothes and and (sic] then he takes 
pictures for his files. Philip Seldon has many nude photos of 
himself on his computer that he shows to women. They are 
pornography of an old man with his clothes off exposing his 
penis. The courts would love to see these photos since he is 
always in court filing harassment lawsuits against people to 
obtain money to supplement his income." (rd. ~ 32). 
4. An April 25, 2011 post by "Employee,1t titled "Philip Seldon 
Vindictive Harassment:1t 
"Philip Seldon is harassing this man since his ex-roommate 
won't go out with him, have sex with him, or take more cohol 
induced photos by himself with her clothes off. This man is 
unstable and women should be cautious around him. He will use 
your iden[t]ity for 'Pay Pal' fraud schemes as he's done with 
many women in the past. Caution with your SSN, credit casrds 
[sic], and never sign anything for him since his past roommates 
have been abused with his fraud schemes. Contact Andrew Spinnell, 
attorney in NYC if you need assistance reporting his fraud 
schemes. Mr. Spinnell has won many cases against Seldon and knows 
of his schemes and tricks utilized for money laundering, tax 
evasion[,] and cash business[] operations." (rd. ~ 39). 
5. An April 25, 2011 post by "Employee fl titled "Philip Seldon:" 
"Philip Seldon is harassing his ex-room[m]ate in vindictive 
manners. He gets women drunk and takes photos of them and then 
uses them for personal perverted manners. He has been asked to 
delete the photos but keeps multiple sets on his computer. Philip 
Seldon has been asked to stay away from his ex-room[m]ate and 
friends and family but he continues to harass people. Philip is 
incapable of falling in love due to the evil hate inside of him." 
~ 46) • 
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3 
to remove the posts if the authors were unable to establish their 
claims. (Id. i Pl. I s Affirmation ~ 8).3 According to Seldon l 
Magedson failed to follow through on his promises prompting thisI 
lawsuit. Based on these allegations, Seldon asserts claims for 
defamation and for breach of contract. 
Defendants move to dismiss the complaint on several grounds. 
They assert that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over them l 
that plaintiff's defamation claims and part of his contract aim 
are barred by the CDA I and that the remaining portion of his 
breach-of-contract claim is barred by the Statute of Frauds. (See 
Plaintiff's version of these events is unclear. In his 
complaint I Seldon refers to a single "agreement," entered into on 
August 241 2011. (See Am. Compl. ~~ 8, 53). However, in his 
affirmation, he refers to two oral contracts formed via 
telephone, one in June 2011 and one in July 2011. Pl.'s 
Affirmation ~ 8). Furthermore, Seldon's pleadings are 
inconsistent regarding what exactly defendants agreed to do 
regarding the offensive posts. At one point Seldon alleges thatI 
Magedson agreed only to remove the posts if they proved 
groundless (see Am. Compl. ~ 8) i at a later point, he asserts 
that Magedson also agreed to make the posts unsearchable and to 
"provide advertising for various companies" with which he was 
associated "in exchange for websites" that he was not using. 
id. ~ 53). In plaintiff's motion papers, he specifies that the 
second contract was only for advertising and not for the removal 
of defamatory posts. (Pl./s Affirmation ~ 9). Regardless of the 
exact details, the substance of Seldon/s contract c im appears 
to be that the parties reached at least one agreement under which 
Magedson promised that if the accusations were unfounded he would 
ensure that the posts in question would not be searchable by the 
general internet-using public. The exact form of the agreement(s) 
is irrelevant to the pertinent jurisdictional analysis. 
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Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl. (\\Defs.' Mot.") 2 16, Nov. 28, 2011).4 
Furthermore, if plaintiff's defamation claims are dismissed, 
defendants argue, this court would lack subject-matter jurisdiction 
over the contract claim. at 2-3, 16-17). We first address 
whether we have jurisdiction over defendants, and answer that 
question in the negative. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Personal Jurisdiction 
A. The Jurisdictional Arguments 
Defendants seek dismissal of both the six defamation claims 
and the contract claim lack of personal jurisdiction. In 
support of their motion, they proffer the declaration of defendant 
Edward Magedson, who reports, without contradiction, that he a 
resident of Arizona, that he is the "manager" of co defendant 
"XCENTRIC VENTURES, L. L. C. ," that Xcentric is based in Tempe, 
4 By order dated November 30, 2012 we deemed the defendants' 
second motion, addressed to the amended complaint, to be a reply 
support of defendants' original motion to dismiss, dated 
October 25, 2011. This motion was construed as addressing both 
complaints. Defendants filed a further reply in support of their 
motion on December 20, 2012, which was permitted under our 
December 16, 2012 endorsed order. 
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Arizona, and that it operates a website located at 
www.ripoffreport.com and www.badbusinessbureau.com. Magedson 
Decl. " 1-2). He describes the so-called "Ripoff" site as a 
passive system under which users post "individual 'reports,'" such 
as comments about the practices of a business and "[0] therI 
consumers or the company that is the subject of the report can then 
comment on that report by posting a rebuttal. 1I (rd. ~ 4). He avers 
that the site "is a free resource available to the public ll and also 
aids law enforcement and other investigations. (rd. ~ 6). 
Magedson goes on to state that Xcentric is an Arizona limited 
liability company, that its sole place of business is in Arizona l 
and that it has no assets, offices or employees in New York State, 
nor any customers there and that it does not run any advertising 
for New York businesses. (rd. ~~ 8-10, 12-13). As for himself, he 
reports that he owns no real estate in New York. (rd. ~ 11). 
Based on this proffer, defendants argue that plaintiff cannot 
satisfy the requisites for jurisdiction under either section 301 or 
section 302(a) (1) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules 
("CPLR"), since defendants have no continuous presence in New York 
and the claims in this case do not arise out of any activity 
undertaken by defendants in this state. (Defs.' Mot. 3-7). Focusing 
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on sections 302 (a) (2) and (3) I they further note that these 
provisions are inapplicable to defamation claims. at 7). 
FinallYI they assert that section 302(a) (4) cannot apply in the 
absence of ownership by them of real estate in New York. (rd. at 
8) • 
lIn opposing this aspect of defendants motion plaintiff seemsl 
to invoke principally section 302 (a) (1) I asserting that he made one 
or more oral agreements with Magedson by telephone while he -- a 
resident of New York - was present in the state though defendantl 
was apparently in Arizona at the time. Since these alleged 
agreements form the basis for plaintiff/s current contract claim l 
he asserts that jurisdiction is available over defendants. 
I Am. Compl. ~ 53 i Pl. I s Affirmation ~ 8).5 He also may be 
understood to suggest that Xcentric's website is interactive and 
that the company offers some commercial services thus arguablyl 
5 Pl a intiff also alludes to New York court cases in which the 
current defendants were also parties and he seems to suggestl 
that the cited decisions stand for the proposition that 
jurisdiction may be asserted over Xcentric. (See .'s 
Affirmation ~~ 4-6). Defendants respond that one of the cited 
decisions made no such findings, that the other decision rejected 
the applicability of section 301 and that its holding that 
section 302(a) (1) applied to this defendant has since been 
rejected by another New York judge. (See Reply in Supp. of Mot. 
to Dismiss ("Defs.' ReplyH) 1-2). 
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triggering general jurisdiction under section 301. 
B. Standards 
Once a defendant challenges a court's exercise of personal 
jurisdiction, plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that 
jurisdiction is indeed proper. See, , Kernan v. Kurz-Hastings, 
Inc., 175 F.3d 236, 240 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Metro. Life Ins. 
Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 566 (2d Cir. 1996)). In 
evaluating whether jurisdiction is proper on a Rule 12 (b) (2) 
motion, the court is afforded a large degree of discretion as to 
process. See, ~, CutCo Indus., Inc. v. Naughton, 806 F.2d 361, 
364 (2d Cir. 1986). It may choose to rely on the pleadings and 
affidavits proffered or to conduct a full evidentiary hearing. See 
Where, as here, no discovery has taken place and no evidentiary 
hearing has been held, the plaintiff need merely make a prima facie 
showing that jurisdiction over defendant is proper. Id.; Grand 
River Enters. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, 425 F.3d 158, 165 (2d 
Cir. 2005) i PDK Labs, Inc. v. Friedlander, 103 F.3d 1105, 1108 (2d 
Cir. 1997); Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A., 902 F.2d 
194, 196 97 (2d Cir. 1990).6 In undertaking a jurisdictional 
6 Even if such a prima facie showing is made, "[e]ventually 
personal jurisdiction must be established by a preponderance of 
the evidence, either at an evidentiary hearing or at trial." 
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analysis, the court must construe the pleadings in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, and must resolve all doubts in his 
favor. DiStefano v. Carozzi N. Am., Inc' f 286 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 
2001) . 
In diversity cases, the court must look to the law of the 
forum state to determine whether the exercise of in personam 
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant is proper. See, ~, 
D.H. 	 Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 104 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(citing Agency Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Grand Rent A Car Corp., 98 
F.3d 25,29 (2d Cir. 1996»; Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 
25, 27 (2d Cir. 1997). If the exercise of jurisdiction is 
appropriate under the relevant state statute, the court then must 
decide whether such exercise comports with the requisites of due 
process. Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 
2007) (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 315 (1945». 
Because this case is before us on diversity, we look to New 
York law to determine whether jurisdiction is proper. Under New 
York law, there are two bases for personal jurisdiction over 
out-of-state defendants: (1) general jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 
~, A.I. Trade Fin .. Inc. v. Petra Bank, 989 F.2d 76, 79 (2d 
Cir. 1993); Bohn v. Bartels, 620 F. Supp.2d 418, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007) . 
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301 ("section 301 11 ), and (2) long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 
302 ("section 30211) . 
1. Section 301 - General Jurisdiction Criteria 
Section 301 confers jurisdiction over a foreign corporation 
"engaged in such a continuous and systematic course of 'doing 
business' [in New York] as to warrant a finding of its 'presence'" 
there. Laufer v. Ostrow, 55 N.Y.2d 305, 309-10, 449 N.Y.S.2d 456, 
458 (1982) (quoting McGowan v. Smith, 52 N.Y.2d 268, 272, 437 
N.Y.S.2d 643 (1981)) i see also Citigroup Inc. v. City Holding Co., 
97 F. Supp.2d 549, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).7 A defendant's "presence" 
is based on the "permanence and continuity" of its commercial 
contacts with the forum state. Hoffri tz for Cutlery, Inc. v. 
Amajact Ltd., 763 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting Tauza v. 
Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 267, 115 N.E. 915, 917 (1917)). 
A court may exercise jurisdiction over such a defendant under 
section 301 regardless of where the cause of action arose. id. 
at 59. 
7 Section 301 of the CPLR states that "[aJ court may exercise 
such jurisdiction over persons, property, or status as might have 
been exercised heretofore." 
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The doing-business analysis is based upon the application of 
a "simple pragmatic" test. Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 
N.Y.2d 426, 432, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625, 628-29 (1965). This search for 
"simple pragmatism" has resulted in a judicial focus on the 
following set of factors: (1) whether the company has an office in 
New Yorki (2) whether it solicits business in New Yorki (2) whether 
it has any bank accounts or other property in New Yorki (4) whether 
it has a phone listing in New York; and (5) whether it has 
individuals permanently located in New York to promote its 
interests. , Hoffritz, 763 F.2d at 58i Seldon v. Direct 
Response Techs. t Inc., 2004 WL 691222, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 
2004). 
A foreign corporation' s "[s] olicitation of business alone will 
not justify a finding of [its] corporate presence in New York . . 
" Laufer, 55 N.Y.2d at 310, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 459; accord 
Citigroup, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 569. Under the "solicitation-plus" 
test, the exercise of personal jurisdiction is proper only if the 
solicitation is both substantial and continuous, and the defendant 
engages in other activities of substance in the state. Citigroup, 
97 F. Supp.2d at 569 (quoting Landoil Res. Corp. v. Alexander & 
Alexander Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d 1039, 1043 44 (2d Cir. 1990)). 
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2. Section 302(a) - Specific Jurisdiction Criteria 
By contrast, section 302 (a) confers jurisdiction over a 
defendant when the cause of action arises out of that defendant's 
intentional contact with New York, no matter how minimal. N. Y. 
C.P.L.R. 302(a) i see also Licci ex reI. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian 
Bank. SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 60 (2d Cir. 2012) i Deutsche Bank Secs., 
Inc. v. Mont. Bd. of Invs., 7 N.Y.3d 65, 71, 818 N.Y.S.2d 164, 166­
67 (2006). Because section 302(a) jurisdiction is focused on where 
the cause of action arose, the analysis is necessarily a claim­
specific one. See, ~, Phillips Exeter Acad. v. Howard Phillips 
Fund, 196 F.3d 284, 289 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating that \\[q]uestions 
of specific jurisdiction are always tied to the particular claims 
asserted") i Smal & Partners UK Ltd. v. Podhurst Orseck P.A., 2012 
WL 1108560, at *3 (D. N.J. Mar. 2, 2012) (citing cases) (specific 
jurisdiction is generally analyzed on a claim-by-claim basis) . 
Under section 302(a) (1), a court may exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who "transacts any business" 
within New York or "contracts anywhere to supply goods or services 
in the state," provided that the cause of action arose out of that 
transaction of business. Deer Consumer Prods .. Inc. v. Little, 35 
Misc.3d 374, 938 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2012 (citing 
14 
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Lebel v. Tello, 272 A.D.2d 103, 104, 707 N.Y.S.2d 426, 427 (1st 
Dep't 2000)).8 "Thus, to determine the existence of jurisdiction 
under section 302 (a) (1), a court must decide (1) whether the 
defendant 'transacts any business' in New York [or contracts to 
supply goods and services in New York] and, if so, (2) whether this 
cause of action 'aris[es] from' such business transaction." As 
for the other long-arm jurisdiction provisions of the CPLR, section 
302{a) (2) permits assertion of jurisdiction over an out-of-state 
defendant who "commits a tortious act within the state" but 
excludes claims for defamation. See, ~, Knight-McConnell v. 
Cummins, 2005 WL 1398590, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 13,2005) (citing 
cases).9 Section 302(a) (3) authorizes jurisdiction over a person 
who "commits a tortious act without the state" if the act causes 
injury to a person or property in New York and the defendant either 
regularly does or solicits business New York or derives 
substantial revenue from goods or services provided in the state or 
8 Sect ion 302{a) (I) of New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules 
states that "[a]s to a cause of action arising from any of the 
acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal 
jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or 
administrator, who in person or through an agent . transacts 
any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply 
goods or services in the state." 
9 A New York "court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any 
non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who in person 
or through an agent. . commits a tortious act within the 
state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character 
arising from the act." N.Y. CPLR § 302{a) (2). 
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should reasonably expect the tortious act to have consequences 
within the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or 
foreign commerce. N. Y. CPLR 302 (a) (3) .10 Finally I section 302 (a) (4) 
permits assertion of jurisdiction over a party who \\owns l uses or 
possesses n any real property in New York. 
C. Assessment of General Jurisdiction 
Plaintiff does not specify which statutory provision he seeks 
to rely upon as a basis jurisdiction l although the few 
decisions that he invokes make clear that their focus is on the 
specific-jurisdiction provisions of section 302 (a) rather than 
general jurisdiction authorized under section 301. This focus is 
not surprising since the courts have made very clear that the merel 
availability of a website to New York residents does not constitute 
10 A New York \\court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any 
non-domiciliarYI or his executor or administrator I who in person 
or through an agent . commits a tortious act without the 
state causing injury to person or property within the state l 
except as to a cause of action for defamation of character 
arising from the act if he (i) regularly does or solicitsl 
bus , or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, 
or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or 
services rendered, in state or (ii) expects or shouldl 
reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and 
derives substantial revenue from interstate or international 
commerce. n 
16 
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a presence, much less a continuous and systematic presence, in the 
state for jurisdictional purposes. 
Plaintiff does not allege any facts in his complaint to 
sustain section 301 jurisdiction. He so does not explicitly argue 
that the court can assert general j sdiction over defendants, and 
hence he offers no explicit evidentiary proffer designed to show a 
basis invoking section 301. Given his pro se status, we broadly 
read his motion papers, but still find no such ground. 
As our court has noted in a prior case brought by plaintiff 
Seldon, section 301 requires court to look to such matters as 
whether the defendant has an fice in New York, has bank accounts 
here, has a phone listing in New York, engages in publ relations 
or has a representative within the state to promote its 
interests. Seldon, 2004 WL 691222, at *4. Plaintiff here does not 
any such facts or proffer any evidence to refute the 
representations of the defendants to the contrary. ~, 
Skrodzki v. Marcello, 810 F. Supp.2d 501,507 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(finding no general jurisdiction where defendants asserted without 
contradiction that they did not maintain an office in New York, did 
not conduct solicitations of business targeting New York consumers, 
did not maintain any bank accounts or other property in New York, 
17 
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did not have any employees or agents in New York, and did not have 
an on-going contractual relationship with a New York corporation) . 
As for the availability of the website here and everywhere 
else within the United States, a defendant's maintenance of even an 
interactive website -generally will not confer general jurisdiction 
over a defendant. II Id. i accord, ~, Yanouskiy v. Eldorado 
Logistics Sys.! Inc., 2006 WL 3050871, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 20 1 
2006) (citing cases) (\\ [t] he mere existence of a rudimentary 
website cannot se a viable issue as to whether this Court has 
general jurisdiction"); Cit igroup 1 97 F. Supp.2d at 570-71. Indeed l 
even if the webs e is interactive in the sense that a viewer may 
contact the operator of the site and exchange information l that 
fact will not permit invocation of general jurisdiction. See l 
Yanouskiy, 2006 WL 3050871 1 at *3 (citing and quoting cases) At 
most, a continuing presence might be established if the web 
operator were using the te to offer and sell products and 
services in the state on a continuing and substantial basis seel 
id. (plaintiff failed to show that "a visitor to the website may 
order l arrange a deliverYI or conduct any actual commerce") i see 
also Knight-McConnell, 2005 WL 1398590, at *3 (noting that absent 
commercial transactions via the website even specific jurisdictionl 
under section 302(a) (1) may be unavailable), but aga plaintiff 
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offers no evidence that the site in question engages in any 
commercial activity in New York, much less on a continuing and 
substantial basis. Plaintiff's references to scattered additional 
contacts with Magedson do not offer any greater support for general 
jurisdiction. 
According to plaintiff, Magedson initiated one or more phone 
calls to himll and entered into an oral contract with him.12 (See 
PI.'s Affirmation , 8). Such activity does not amount to 
"systematic and continuous" conduct; isolated and infrequent 
commercial contacts are insufficient to warrant subjecting 
defendants to general jurisdiction in New York. See, ~, Barrett 
v. Tema Dev. (1988), Inc., 463 F. Supp.2d 423, 430-33 & 432 n.8 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (court agreed that it would not have general 
jurisdiction over defendant; in addition, court found no specific 
jurisdiction over defendant in breach-of -contract action where 
defendant had a single in-person meeting with plaintiff to 
negotiate terms, had communicated both telephonically and 
11 Magedson disputes this point. Drawing all inferences in favor 
of plaintiff, we assume that Magedson initiated all 
correspondence with plaintiff. (See, ~, PI.'s Affirmation' 
8) . 
12Plaintiff does not lege that Magedson contacted the authors 
of the allegedly defamatory posts by phone, and there is no 
indication whether those authors were in New York. Am. 
Compl. , 8). 
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electronically with plaintiff during negotiations t and had a New 
York bank account) i see also Skrodzki t 810 F. Supp.2d at 507 11 
(finding no general or specific jurisdiction where a contract t with 
an accompanying exchange of monetary consideration t was negotiated 
by phone and additional electronic communications; court found that 
the transaction was not substantial and the contractts "center of 
gravity· was outside of the state) . 
We note that plaintiff cites one decision by a New York State 
Supreme Court justice in Intellect Art Multimedia, Inc. v. 
Milewski t 2009 WL 2915273 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Sept. 11t 2009) t 
support of argument that j sdiction over defendants is 
proper but the court there noted that "it is undisputed thatt 
Xcentric is not subject to general jurisdiction based on presence 
or domicile in New York under CPLR § 301 . Id. at *5.II 
Plaintiff also proffers a portion of a memorandum of law that 
was filed by the attorney for Intellect Art in that same case (the 
"IA Memoli) t and we assume that he invites us to adopt the argument 
of the attorney for Intellect Art in which he invokes section 301. 
(PI.ts Affirmation Ex. Bt at 5 6). Although the proffered 
memorandum argues that Xcentric has certain business practices that 
should be deemed to give it a continuing business presence in New 
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York, Seldon does not provide the exhibits cited in the proffered 
memorandum that formed the factual premise for this argument. We 
may take judicial notice of events in another lawsuit, see, 
Lefkowitz v. Bank of N.Y., 676 F. Supp.2d 229, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(gathering cases), but we cannot take into consideration the 
conclusory assertions of the attorney a memorandum of law in 
that other case, and in any event, as we note, the New York court 
-- which had the benefit of the evidentiary showing that we lack -­
rejected Intellect Art's argument that section 301 jurisdiction 
could be invoked in the case against Xcent c. 
Finally, even if we relied on what is referenced to generally 
in the Intellect Art submission to the state court and ignored that 
court's rejection of general jurisdiction, we would come to the 
same conclusion. The plaintiff in that case, and Seldon here by 
implication, suggested that ripoffreport. com's Terms of Service 
("TOS") and Xcentric' s Corporate Advocacy Program ("CAP") justified 
invoking general jurisdiction. (IA Memo 6, 8). That argument is 
meritless. 
According to Intellect Art, the TOS is an agreement by which 
a member ripoffreport.com forfeits certain authorship rights in 
exchange for free use of the site. (IA Memo 6, 11). Supposedly, all 
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ripoffreport. com users must agree to the TOS before they are 
allowed to use the site. The CAP { Intellect Art claims{ 
is a program through which Magedson solicits and contracts with New 
York businesses to provide reputation-repair services in exchange 
for a fee. (See at 6). Unlike the TOS, users are not required 
to enter into the CAP contract as a prerequisite for free use of 
the site. (Id. at 6, 9). In factI according to the IA Memo, the CAP 
is an effort to make money not from the webs 's consumer-posting 
contingent, but from the subjects of negative posts. (Id. at 9-10) . 
Taking Seldon's implicit assertion that all "users" (which we 
assume to mean posters) (see IA Memo 6) must agree to the TOS as 
true{ such an agreement would appear to satisfy the systematic and 
continuous quality of contacts required to invoke juri ction 
under section 301. However, the TOS is not commercial, and, 
therefore, Xcentric is not "doing business" in New York when it 
requires posters to agree to the TOS. Seldon does not allege that 
any purchases are made or that any money is exchanged under the 
TOS. (Id. at 6, 11) Thus, even if every New York user must agree 
to the TOS, that and of i f would not demonstrate that 
Xcentric is "doing business" within the state. Rescuecom Corp. 
v. Hyams, 477 F. Supp.2d 522, 529-30 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding no 
specific jurisdiction over defendant where website visitors could 
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register and receive login names and passwords registered membersl 
could post messages to each other in the message forum or send 
private communications to each other and registered members agreedI 
to be bound by terms and conditions of membership) . 
Unlike the TOS I Xcentric/s CAP -- as described by Seldon -­
comprises a potenti commercial contact with New York. Under the 
CAP I defendants allegedly perform internet-reputation-repair 
services for a (~I Pl. I s Affirmation , 7). However I 
solicitation of business through the CAP is insufficient to find 
personal jurisdiction over defendants unless that solicitation is 
"'substantial and continuous I and defendant[s] engage[] in other 
activities of substance in the state. l " CitigrouPI 97 F. Supp.2d at 
S69 (quoting Laufer l SS N.Y.2d at 310 1 449 N.Y.S.2d at 4S9i Landoil 
Res. Corp. I 918 F.2d at 1043 44). 
Plaintiff ils to proffer any information l however I to 
demonstrate that defendants CAP solicitation in New York isI 
"substantial and continuous II - or indeed has occurred at all - - or 
that defendants engage in other substantive activity in New York. 
Neither Seldon/s complaint nor the IA Memo detail how defendants 
solicit customers for enrollment in CAP I or how many New York 
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individuals and businesses, if any, are enrolled in that program. l3 
It is even unclear whether Seldon claims that he himself enrolled 
in CAP or that he simply entered into a separate agreement with 
Magedson. In addition, Magedson states that Xcentric has "no 
customers in New York," although he does not specify whether a 
customer of CAP would necessarily also be a customer of Xcentric. 
(See Magedson Decl. ~ 13). 
In sum, neither Xcentric's TOS nor its CAP evidence the 
requisite systematic and continuous commercial contact with New 
York to confer jurisdiction under section 301. Cf. Seldon, 2004 WL 
691222, at *4i Cornell v. Assicurazioni Generale, Consol., 2000 WL 
284222, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2000) (no general jurisdiction 
over defendants who maintained a website accessible by New York 
citizensi plaintiffs did not contend that the website was created 
in New York, that the server on which the site existed and from 
which it was accessed was located in New York, or that defendants' 
use of the website was purposefully directed toward New York) . 
13 The IA Memo alleges that Magedson and a "maligned corporation" 
entered into a CAP contract for $50,000.00 plus a $1,500 monthly 
retainer. (IA Memo 10). However, the IA Memo does not indicate 
whether the corporation was incorporated or based in New York. 
(Id. ) . 
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Seldon has the burden of making a prima facie showing of 
jurisdiction under section 301. As alleged l the totality of 
defendants I purposeful contacts with New York amount to a handful 
of communications resulting in at least one contract with Seldon, 
the existence of a non-commercial interactive website on the 
internet a non-commercial contract with each New York user (theI 
TOS) and a commercial relationship with an unknown number (if any)1 
of New York companies and/or individuals via the CAP. Defendants do 
not maintain New York offices or employees and have no property or 
assets in New York. Given the absence of factual allegations 
demonstrating that defendants are "present II in New York, Seldon has 
not made the requisite prima facie showing that defendants are 
subject to general jurisdiction here. See UTC Fire & Sec. Ams. 
Corp., Inc. v. NCS Power, Inc' l --- F.Supp.2d , 2012 WL 423349 1 
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10 1 2012) (finding no general jurisdiction 
over defendant who maintained a website which was accessible inl 
New York sold products outside of New York that were used inl 
products sold within New York and solicited three New York-basedl 
customers I one of whom entered into a contract with defendant) i see 
also Schmidt v. Martec Indus. Corp., 2009 WL 2883071 1 at *3 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2009) (finding no general jurisdiction where 
plaintiff did not make prima facie showing that defendant did 
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business in New York); Madison Models, Inc. v. Casta, 2003 WL 
21978628, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2003) (same). 
D. Assessment of Specific Jurisdiction 
Even if general jurisdiction is lacking, section 302(a) allows 
a court to exercise personal jurisdiction in certain circumstances 
where the cause of action alleged arises out of defendants' 
contacts with New York. However, for the reasons set forth below, 
plaintiff fails to show that there is specific jurisdiction over 
defendants pursuant to section 302(a) for either the defamation 
claims or the contract claim. 
1. The Defamation Claims 
a. Sections 302 (a) (2), (3), and (4) 
As we have noted, sections 302 (a) (2) and (3) explicitly 
exclude defamation claims, and they therefore offer no basis to 
assert jurisdiction over plaintiff's first six claims. See, ~, 
Best Van Lines, 490 F. 3d at 244 -45. As for section 302 (a) (4) lit 
requires that the defendant "own[], use[] or possess[] real 
property situated within the state. It is not disputed thatII 
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defendants have no real property here, thus precluding use of that 
provision to assert jurisdiction. 
We accordingly turn to the remaining potentially applicable 
provision, section 302(a) (1). 
b. Section 302 (a) (1) 
Section 302(a) (1) confers personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant who "transacts any business within the state or contracts 
anywhere to supply goods or services in the state. /I This subsection 
"confers jurisdiction over 'a defendant who purposefully avails 
self of the privilege of conducting activities within New York, 
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws,' where the 
cause of action arises out of the subject matter of the business 
transacted." Citigroup, 97 F. Supp.2d at 564 (quoting Viacom Int'l, 
Inc. v. Melvin Simon Prods., 774 F. Supp. 858, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991)). Unlike under section 301, a single business transaction can 
suffice to confer jurisdiction under section 302 (a) (1), if the 
claim alleged arises out of that transaction. Id. (citing Pilates, 
Inc. v. Pilates Inst., Inc., 891 F. Supp. 175, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) i 
Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 460, 467, 527 N.Y.S.2d 
195, 198-99 (1988)). 
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The meaning of "transacting business /' under section 302 (a) (1) 
"overlaps significantlyll with the minimum-contacts due-process 
test; however I New York/s long-arm statute encompasses a wider 
range of activity than the minium-contacts doctrine. Best Van 
Lines, 490 F.3d at 247-48 (citing McKee Elec. Co. v. Rauland-Borg 
Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 377, 382, 283 N.Y.S.2d 34, 37 (1967». "The court 
must look to the totality of the circumstances to determine the 
existence of purposeful activity and may not subject the defendant 
to jurisdiction based on random, fortuitous, or attenuated 
contacts. 1I K.C.P.L., Inc. v. Nash, 1998 WL 823657, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 24, 1998) (citing CutCo, 806 F.2d at 365). Depending on their 
nature, a defendant's contacts with New York via the internet can 
provide a ground for 302 (a) (1) jurisdiction. Knight-McConnell, 2005 
WL 1398590, at *2 (citing Citigroup, 97 F. Supp.2d at 564-65). 
In assessing the reach of the "transacting-business" concept 
when the conduct in question occurs over a website, we note that 
"many courts have turned to the standards set out more than ten 
years ago by a judge of the Western strict of Pennsylvania in 
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 
1997).11 Best Van Lines. Inc., 490 F.3d at 251. To this end, courts 
have considered a "spectrum of internet interactivity" in 
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evaluating whether jurisdiction is proper. Id. (discussing 
interactivi ty framework enumerated by the Zippo court) "At one end 
of the spectrum are 'passive' websites which display, but do not 
permit an exchange of, information." Seldon, 2004 WL 691222, at *3 
(quoting Hsin Ten Enter. USA, Inc. v. Clark Enters., 138 F. Supp.2d 
449/ 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)). "At the other end of the spectrum are 
cases in which the defendant clearly does business over the 
Internet/ such as where it repeatedly transmits computer files to 
customers in other states." Hsin Ten/ 138 F. Supp. 2d at 456. 
"Occupying the middle ground are 'interact i ve' websi tes, which 
permi t the exchange of information between the defendant and 
website viewers/If but whose commercial quality is not so overt. Id. 
"In this 'middle ground,' a court's jurisdictional inquiry is 
guided by the commercial nature of the information exchanged and 
the degree to which the website is interactive." In re Ski Train 
Fire in Kaprun, Austria on Nov. 11, 2000/ 343 F. Supp.2d 208/ 215 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) i accord Yash Raj Films (USA) Inc. v. Dishant.com 
LLC, 2009 WL 4891764/ at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2009). Interactive 
websites with significant commercial elements are generally found 
sufficient to constitute in-state transaction of business while 
those lacking significant commercial elements typically are not. 
See, ~, Rescuecom Corp. v. Hyams/ 477 F. Supp.2d 522, 529 
(N.D.N.Y. 2006) (comparing/ ~/ Hsin Ten/ 138 F. Supp.2d at 456 
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(defendants transacted business in New York where out-of-state 
websi te was highly interactive and enabled New York viewer to 
purchase products online, download order form, and chat with online 
representative) with Knight-McConnell, 2005 WL 1398590, at *3 
(defendants did not transact business in New York based on online 
postings of statements about New York resident on out of-state 
website)) . 
We note that " [w]hile analyzing a defendant's conduct under 
the Zippo sliding scale of interactivity may help frame the 
jurisdictional inquiry in some cases ... it does not amount to a 
separate framework for analyzing internet-based jurisdiction. BestII 
Van Lines, Inc., 490 F.3d at 251 (quotation marks omitted). 
"Instead, traditional statutory and constitutional principles 
remain the touchstone of the inquiry. II Id. (quotation marks 
omitted) . Thus, the Second Circuit has noted that this 
interactivity analysis "may be useful for analyzing personal 
jurisdiction under section 302(a) (1), but only insofar as it helps 
to decide whether the defendant 'transacts any business' in New 
York that is, whether the defendant, through the website, 
'purposefully avail [ed] himself of the privilege of conducting 
activities within New York, thus invoking the benefits and 
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protections of its laws.'" at 252 (alteration in original) 
(quoting CutCo, 806 F.2d at 865). 
Defamation claims are treated differently from other claims 
under section 302(a). Such claims "are accorded separate treatment 
to reflect the state's policy of preventing disproportionate 
restrictions on freedom of expression -- though, where purposeful 
transactions of business have taken place in New York, it may not 
be said that subjecting the defendant to this State's jurisdiction 
is an unnecessary inhibition on freedom of speech or the press." 
SPCA of Upstate N.Y., Inc. v. Am. Working Collie Ass'n, 18 N.Y.3d 
400, 404, 940 N.Y.S.2d 525, 527 (2012) (citation omitted). 
Therefore, New York courts construe "transacts any business within 
the state" more narrowly in defamation cases than in other cases. 
at 405, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 529 (quoting Best Van Lines, 490 F.3d 
at 248). "In other cases, proof of one transaction, or a single 
act, in New York is sufficient to invoke [long-arm] jurisdiction, 
even though the defendant never enters New York, [but in] 
defamation cases . the single act of uttering a defamation, no 
matter how loudly, is not a transact[ion of] business that may 
provide the foundation for personal jurisdiction." Best Van Lines, 
490 F.3d at 248 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (citing 
cases). In the context of allegedly defamatory website postings, 
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courts applying New York law have found that the posting of 
defamatory material on a website that is accessible in New York 
does not alone constitute the transacting of business under section 
302(a) (1). Best Van Lines, 490 F.3d 250 (citing cases). However, 
-jurisdiction will lie if the [defamatory] posting is 
intended to target or focus on internet users in the state where 
the cause of action is filed." Knight-McConnell, 2005 WL 1398590, 
at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Best Van Lines v. 
Walker, 2004 WL 964009, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2004) i Seldon, 2004 
WL 691222 , at * 4 - 5) . 
Plaintiff's defamation aims are based solely on the alleged 
libelous postings on defendants' website. But the fact that 
allegedly defamatory posts may be viewed in New York is 
insufficient to sustain a finding of jurisdiction under section 
302(a). Knight-McConnell, 2005 WL 1398590, at *3 (quoting 
Lines, 2004 WL 964009, at *5) (defamatory online postings about New 
York-resident plaintiff insufficient to provide a basis for 
jurisdiction) i Seldon, 2004 WL 691222, at *4. Jurisdiction will lie 
only if the posts are intended to target internet users in New 
York. Id. (quoting Seldon, 2004 WL 691222, at *4-5). 
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Nothing in the complaint, which includes the full text of the 
posts at issue suggests that the website targeted New York usersl 
as distinct from users in other states. While some of the posts 
mention New York l they do so in the context of describing either 
Seldon himself or his New York-based conduct. (~, Am. Compl. ~ 
32). Defendants do not reference New York in an effort to attract 
membership or readership from, or to solicit business from, that 
state; indeed, the posts were not even authored by defendants. 
Though some of the posts suggest that readers should contact a New 
York City attorney concerning Seldon's purported misdeeds, those 
references originate from users unaffiliated with defendants I and 
also do not serve as audience-targeting mechanisms. , ~, id. 
~~ 25 1 39). AdditionallYI none of the titles or headings of the 
posts which are presumably intended to attract readership and are 
allegedly authored by defendants (Am. Compl. ~ 9) I mention New 
York. (~, id. ~~ 18,32,39 (headings include "Sexual Pervert / ll 
"Tax Free Money Income,lI and "Philip Seldon Vindictive 
Harassment ll )). Finally, 1 of the postings are equally viewable by 
users nationwide (and presumably internationally). This analysis 
points to the absence of evidence that defendants' website activi ty 
which is the only conduct that gives rise to plaintiff's 
defamation claims - amounts to the transaction of business in New 
l 
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York. The characteristics of the website referred to by 
plaintiff as interactive -- do not alter this conclusion. 
Defendants' website, ripoffreport.com, is a low-level 
"interactive" website that falls into the middle ground of the 
Zippo interactivity spectrum. The website involves more than the 
passive posting of information -- its members can post reviews of 
businesses, which defendants routinely review and for which they 
provide the headings. Moreover, posters and the targets of the 
postings can communicate with the website operators. See The 
Katiroll Co., Inc. v. Kati Roll & Platters, Inc., 2010 WL 2911621, 
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 9,2010) (citing Pitbull Prods., Inc. v. 
Universal Netmedia, Inc., 2008 WL 1700196, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 
2008)) ("A website that allows users to post on a message board t 
but from which no goods can be ordered or purchased falls in th[e] 
"middle ground.") i see also Rescuecom, 477 F. Supp.2d at 529-30i 
Seldon, 2004 WL 691222, at *4 5. However, the website has not been 
shown to be commercial in nature, as there are no allegations that 
users can engage in any commercial transactions through the 
website. See Capitol Records, LLC v. VideoEgg, Inc., 611 F. Supp.2d 
349, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (a website does not conduct traditional 
business over the internet where it neither sells goods or services 
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through the website nor charges membership fees} i see also 
Citigroup, 97 F. Supp.2d at 566 n.B. 
Merely hosting an interactive, non-commercial website with a 
nationwide audience, which website is not alleged to raise 
significant revenues from New York consumers, does not amount to 
defendants purposefully availing themselves of the privilege of 
doing business in New York under section 302(a} (1). See Capitol 
Records, LLC, 611 F. Supp.2d at 358-60j Seldon, 2004 WL 691222, at 
*4-5 (no jurisdiction over defendants under section 302(a) (1) for 
defamation claims where defendants occasionally solicited business 
in New York, negotiated a contract from out of state, via 
telephone, with plaintiff, who was located in New York, mailed a 
proposed contract from out of state to plaintiff in New York, and 
maintained a website that contained interactive message boards}; 
Sino Clean Energy Inc. v. Little, 2012 WL 1849658, at *7 (Sup. Ct. 
N.Y. Cnty. May 21, 2012) ("internet activities of maintaining a 
website with discussion threads and email subscription offering, 
posting responses and comments to the website users, who could 
download reports and files directly to their computers, are 
insufficient to support a necessary finding that [defendant] 
purposefully and knowingly interacted with New York residents or 
otherwise targeted New York for business"); cf. M. Shanken 
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Commc'ns, Inc. v. Cigar500.com, 2008 WL 2696168, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 
July 7, 2008) (finding section 302 (a) (1) jurisdiction over 
defendants because interactive website was primarily used to effect 
commercial transactionsi even though website did not target New 
York market, 10% of website's revenue was derived from New York 
consumers) . 
Given the fact that the defamation claims arise solely from 
the posting of reports by members of the public on a mostly 
interactive website that does not itself engage in commercial 
activity, much less commercial activity targeting New York, 
plaintiff cannot sustain his burden to demonstrate that this claim 
arose from the transacting of business in New York by the 
defendants. See, ~, Best Van Lines, 490 F.3d 250-51 (gathering 
cases) i Knight-McConnell, 2005 WL 1398590, at *3; see also SPCA of 
Upstate N.Y., Inc., 18 N.Y.3d at 404-06, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 527 29. 14 
14 Plaintiff cites one court decision that held that jurisdiction 
over Xcentric could be asserted here under section 302(a) (1). 
Intellect Art, 2009 WL 2915273, at *5-6. That conclusion has been 
rejected by another state court (see Order, Greenky v. Joslin, 
101174/2010, Jan. 23, 2012, available at 
http://decisions.courts.state.ny.us/fcas/fcas_docs/2012JAN/300101 
1742010003SCIV.pdf (court granted Xcentric's motion to dismiss 
for lack of jurisdiction under sections 301 and 302)), and in any 
event, given both the record before us and the demanding standard 
that a plaintiff must meet to pull an out-of state defendant into 
a New York court based on allegedly defamatory statements posted 
by others on a website, plaintiff here plainly falls short. ~, 
Best Van Lines, 490 F.3d 250-54. 
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2. The Breach-of-Contract Claim 
In assessing potential grounds for asserting jurisdiction over 
plaintiff's contract claim, we are left, once again, with section 
302(a) (1) as the only potential candidate. Sections 302(a) (2) and 
(3) apply only to tortious conduct, see Florczak v. Staffieri, 2006 
WL 1085173, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2006) (citing Amigo Foods 
Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank-N.Y., 39 N.Y.2d 391, 396, 348 N.E.2d 
581, 584 (1976)),15 and 3 02 (a) (4) is inapplicable, as we have noted, 
because defendants neither own nor use real property in New York. 
Section 302(a) (1) also does not save plaintiff's claim. 
The Second Circuit has identified the following factors as 
relevant to whether a contracting party has "transacted businessH 
in New York: 
whether the defendant has an ongoing 
contractual relationship with a New York 
15 As the New York courts have observed, "a breach of contract 
does not give rise to a tort action" without "a breach of duty 
separate and distinct from a breach of contract." Skouras v. Brut 
Prods., Inc., 45 A.D.2d 646, 647, 360 N.Y.S.2d 811, 813 (1st 
Dep't 1974) (quotation omitted). No such conduct is alleged in 
the present case. (See Am. Compl. " 52-55 (plaintiff's breach­
of contract claim)). Therefore, sections 302(a) (2) and (3) are 
inapplicable to plaintiff/s breach-of 
Florczak, 2006 WL 1085173, at *3 (citing Amigo 
N.Y.2d at 396, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 584) . 
contract claim. 
Foods 
Accord 
Corp. I 39 
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entity, whether the contract was negotiated or 
executed in New York, whether the defendant 
visited New York in connection with the 
contract, and whether the contract is to be 
governed by New York law under a choice of law 
clause. 
Berkshire Capital Grp., LLC v. Palmet Ventures, LLC, 307 F. App'x 
479, 480 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Sunward Elecs., Inc. v. McDonald, 
362 F.3d 17, 22-23 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Agency Rent A Car Sys., 
Inc., 98 F.3d at 29)). While these factors are relevant, they are 
not exhaustive, and no single factor is dispositive. AIG Fin. 
Prods. Corp. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No.1 of Snohomish Cnty., Wash., 
675 F. Supp.2d 354, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Sunward Elecs.( 
Inc., 362 F.3d at 23) . The ultimate jurisdictional determination is 
based on the totality of circumstances. (quoting Best Van 
Lines, Inc., 490 F.3d at 246). 
"The Court of Appeals has made clear that given rapid advances 
in technology, physical presence in New York is not a prerequisite 
for jurisdiction so long as the defendant 'on his or her own 
initiative projects himself or herself into this state to engage in 
a sustained and substantial transaction of business. '" Berkshire 
Capital Grp., LLC, 307 F. App'x at 481 (quoting Fischbarg v. 
Doucet, 9 N.Y.3d 375, 382, 849 N.Y.S.2d 501, 507 (2007)). However, 
when a contract is to be performed entirely outside of New York, 
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the fact that the defendant engaged in some contact with a New York 
purchaser does not necessarily mean that the defendant transacted 
business in New York under section 302(a) (1). Id. "' [C]ourts seem 
generally loath to uphold jurisdiction under the 'transaction in 
New York' prong of CPLR 302 if the contract at issue was negotiated 
solely by mail, telephone, and fax without any New York presence by 
the defendant. "' Skrodzki, 810 F. Supp.2d at 512 (quoting Worldwide 
Futgol Assoc., Inc. v. Event Entm't, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 173, 177 
(E.D.N.Y. 1997)). A defendant's communications into New York will 
suffice to establish specific jurisdiction only if they are related 
to a transaction that had its "center of gravity" inside New York, 
into which a defendant "proj ected himself." Maranga v. Vira, 386 F. 
Supp.2d 299, 306 (S. D.N. Y. 2005) {quoting Wilhelmshaven Acquisition 
Corp. v. Asher, 810 F. Supp. 108, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)) .16 
Seldon contends that he and Magedson entered into at least one 
oral contract that they negotiated over the phone and, perhaps, 
email. (Am. Compl. " 8, 53 -54 (alleging that plaintiff and 
16 Even when a defendant has communicated "with plaintiff in New 
York by phone, fax and possibly mail . . . no court has extended 
§ 302(a) (1) to reach a nondomiciliary who never entered New York, 
who was solicited outside of New York, who performed outside of 
New York such services as were performed, and who is alleged to 
have neglected to perform other services outside of New York." 
Skrodzki, 810 F. Supp.2d at 512 (emphasis added) (quoting Bank 
Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez! 171 F.3d 779! 
788-89 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
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defendants entered into an agreement to remove, or make 
unsearchable, the allegedly defamatory postings if they were 
unsubstantiated) j PI.'s Affirmation ~ 8 (alleging that the parties 
made "two oral contracts . . over the telephone" and that they 
subsequently had "further" telephone and email conversations)). 17 
Under those contracts, Seldon asserts at one point, Magedson agreed 
unconditionally to remove the posts about Sheldon from the 
website's searchable content and to prohibit future posts about 
Seldon. (Am. Compl. ~ 53). He so supposedly agreed to provide 
advertising on the site for companies affiliated with Seldon. 
(Id.). In exchange, Magedson legedly was to receive "websites" 
that Seldon "was not using," the value of which Seldon claims was 
approximately $150,000.00. (Id. i Pl.' s Affirmation ~ 9) .18 Plaintiff 
asserts that the term of the advertising contract was less than one 
year, although the parties had contemplated amending the contract 
to include a five-year advertising term. (PI.'s Affirmation ~ 9) .19 
17 We infer that for all of the relevant correspondence, plaintiff 
was located in New York and defendants were located in Arizona. 
18 As previously noted, Seldon offers several inconsistent 
versions of what these oral contracts required of Magedson. 
(See Am. Compl. ~~ 8, 53i PI.'s Affirmation ~ 9). We assume, for 
our analysis, that plaintiff's broadest characterization of the 
agreements is correct. 
19 Plaintiff's original complaint alleged that the advertising 
term was for five years. (Compl. ~ 52). 
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Based on these allegations ldon asserts that he andl 
Magedson entered into an on-going contractual relationship. 
However I the totality of the circumstances suggests that exercise 
of long-arm jurisdiction under section 302(a) (1) would be improper 
because defendants did not "transact business" in New York. In this 
regard l a ngle agreement (or a single set of agreements) between 
a New York resident and someone outside of the state iS withoutI 
more I insufficient to confer jurisdiction if the contract s "centerI 
of gravity" is not in New York. Kimco Exch. Place Corp. v. 
Thomas Benz, Inc' l 34 A.D.3d 433 / 434-35 1 824 N.Y.S.2d 353 1 354 (2d 
Dep/t 2006) (marketing directed nationallYI the sending of executed 
contracts to New Yorkl and making "a few telephone calls ll to New 
York insufficient to grant long-arm jurisdiction) i Skrodzki I 810 F. 
Supp.2d at 513 (quoting DirecTV Latin Am., LLC v. Park 610, LLC I 
691 F. Supp.2d 405 1 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)) (finding no personal 
jurisdiction under section 302(a) (1) where defendant/s contacts 
with New York consisted of telephone calls fax transmissions andl l 
other correspondence in connection with negotiating a contract that 
had its center of gravity well outside the state; the only 
relationship between New York and the transaction at issue was the 
plaintiff was a New York resident) i Maranga 386 F. Supp.2d at 306l 
08 (defendant did not transact business in New York under section 
302 (a) (1) even though he entered into an on-going contractual 
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relationship with plaintiff because contract was executed out of 
state, defendant never visited New York in connection with the 
contract, there was no New York choice-of -law clause in the 
contract, no payment entered New York under the contract, and only 
one party was located in New York during contract negotiations) . 
In this case, the contract(s) as alleged by Seldon were agreed 
to when Magedson was not in the state, and they called for changes 
to the defendants' website that would be performed in Arizona. 
Indeed, there is no suggestion that performance of any aspect of 
the agreements required activity in New York, and plaintiff does 
not refute Magedson's assertion that any agreed-upon services would 
have been performed by defendants in Arizona. (See Magedson Decl. 
~~ 2, 9-10). As the courts have noted in the context of contract 
claims, \\ [iJ n determining jurisdiction, the place of performance is 
more critical than the place of the execution of a contract. II 
Cooper. Robertson & Partners. LLP v. Vail, 143 F. Supp.2d 367, 371 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001). Moreover, Magedson did not vis New York to 
negotiate the terms of the alleged contract(s), and Seldon does not 
mention any choice-of-Iaw provision or otherwise indicate that New 
York law governs the agreement(s). In this case, the totality of 
the circumstances militates against a finding that Magedson's 
alleged contract with plaintiff projected defendants into New York 
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in such a fashion as to trigger jurisdiction under section 
302 (a) (1) . 
Plaintiff's relies on Intellect Art to dispute this 
conclusion. We find his argument unpersuasive. 
In Intellect Art, plaintiff sued Xcentric for defamation and 
product liability and sued a co defendant who has posted on the 
ripoff website for defamation on breach of contract. 2009 WL 
2915273, at *2. In pursing jurisdiction over Xcentric, plaintiff 
alleged that it profits by "soliciting business from the companies 
and individuals who have had ive posts made against them. For 
a fee, Xccentric [sic] of to enroll companies and/or 
individuals in a program by which Xcentric will follow-up[] with 
the aggrieved individuals or entities" to resolve complaints posted 
on ripoffreport.com. Id. at *6. The court found that Xcentric had 
sufficiently "transacted business ll in New York through its website 
to sati section 302 (a) (1) because of "the high level of 
interactivity of the website, the undisputed fact that information 
is freely exchanged between website users and Xcentric, 
Xcentric's alleged role in manipulating user's information and 
data, and Xcentric's sol itation of companies and individuals to 
, resolve' the complaints levied against them on Ripoff Report." Id. 
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Notably, Intellect Art did not sue Xcentric for contract breach, 
and the court therefore never addresses the possible basis for 
asserting such a claim in New York against that defendant.20 This 
decision, which has been explicitly and persuasively rejected by 
another New York court, see A-I Tech. Inc. v. Magedson, Index No. 
150033/10 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. June 22, 2011) (available at 
https://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/fbem/DocumentDisplayServlet?docu 
mentId=bSxX92HGxtUbmlsDpOeFMA==&system=prod) i see also Greenky v. 
Joslin, Index No. 101174/2010 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Jan. 23, 
2 012 ( dec i s ion a v a i I a b I e a t 
http://decisions.courts.state.ny.us/fcas/fcas_docs/2012JAN/300101 
1742010003SCIV.pdf), does not save plaintiff's contract claim 
against defendants. 
In any event, the alleged efforts of Xcentric to capitalize 
financially on negative postings on the website (through the 
program referred to as CAP) does not provide jurisdiction here. 
Although Magedson is alleged to have solicited CAP business from 
the subjects of negative posts, Seldon does not expressly lege 
20 It bears noting that the co defendant sought dismissal only of 
the defamation claim, and never challenged the contract claim. 
Intellect Art, 2009 WL 2915273, at *2. Accordingly, the court had 
no occasion to address jurisdictional issues regarding any 
contract claim. 
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that such solicitation occurs via the website. 21 Moreover, even 
assuming that it does (see IA Memo 10), Xcentric's possible 
nationwide solicitation of the subjects of negative posts for 
enrollment in CAP does not convert defendants' ownership of an 
otherwise non-commercial message board into a purposeful 
transaction of business in New York. See, , Sayeedi v. Walser, 
15 Misc.3d 621, 628, 835 N.Y.S.2d 840, 846 (Civ. Ct. Richmond Cnty. 
2007) (no specific jurisdiction absent evidence that defendant 
purposefully invoked the benefits and protections of New York law, 
that defendant directed marketing at potential New York customers, 
or that defendant was soliciting New York residents in a manner 
different from its efforts vis-a-vis residents of any other state) . 
Furthermore, plaintiff does not claim that any CAP related fees ­
or any funds that matter -- are transmitted electronically via 
the website, or that website users can purchase or enroll in the 
CAP online. Even considering the webs e together with Seldon's 
alleged agreements with Magedson, Seldon has not made a prima facie 
showing that defendants transacted business in New York for 
purposes of section 302(a) (1). See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Morning Sun Bus Co., 2011 WL 381612, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2011) 
(no jurisdiction under section 302 (a) (1) i defendants did not 
21 In fact, with respect to Seldon, it appears that defendants' 
reputation-repair services were offered over the telephone and 
not through their website. PI.'s Affirmation ~ 8). 
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transact business in New York where website provided contact 
information for defendants' out-of-state sales representatives but 
New York customers could not purchase advertised goods through 
defendants' website); Arouh v. Budget Leasing, Inc., 63 A.D.3d 506, 
506, 883 N.Y.S.2d 4, 5 (1st Dep't 2009) (negot ion of the 
purchase of an automobile via e-mail and telephone, which New York 
plaintiff initiated after viewing the car on defendant's web site, 
state
insufficient to constitute the transaction of bus s within New 
York under section 302 (a) (1) because website, which described 
available cars and featured a link for e-mail contact but did not 
allow website customer to purchase a car, was not a projection 
defendant into the state; in addition, car was to be picked up in 
Texas, so there was no contract to "supply goods or services in the 
ll ); see Skrodzki, 810 F. Supp.2d at 513 (quoting ==~~~ 
Latin Am.! LLC, 691 F. Supp.2d at 420). 
E. Conclusion 
Based on the foregoing, Seldon has not met his burden of 
demonstrating that jurisdiction over defendants is proper. Thus, we 
recommend that this case be dismissed lack of personal 
jurisdiction. However, we will address the balance of defendants' 
dismis motion for the benefit of the dist ct court in event 
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that it finds that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over 
defendants is proper. 
II. The Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 et seq. 
Defendants argue that Seldon's six defamation claims and part 
of Seldon's contract claim are barred by the CDA' s grant of 
immunity to websites that publish defamatory third-party content. 
(See Defs.' Mot. 8 14). Seldon asserts that CDA immunity is 
unavailable for a number of reasons related to defendants' alleged 
involvement in authoring and otherwise manipulating the offending 
material -- because defendants author the "title tags" of user's 
posts; because Xcentric "examines" every post and decides whether 
to post it, and if so, whether to modify it; because Xcentric has 
the ability to, and does, "monitor, read, and censor" the posts on 
its website; and because Xcentric "edits and removes content for a 
large fee" pursuant to the CAP. (PI.'s Affirmation ~ 7; Am. Compl. 
~~ 6 -7, 9). 
The Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230, et 
~, immunizes providers of "interactive computer services" 
against liability arising from content created by third parties. 
Section 230 (c) (1) provides that \\ [n] 0 provider or user of an 
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interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider." Section 230 (e) (3) preempts any state law that is 
inconsistent with the protections that section 230 offers. Thus I 
under section 230 internet service providers are shielded from 
liability arising from defamation and other state-law claims that 
are premised on posts ofl or links tO I third-party content. See 
Murawski v. Pataki l 514 F. Supp.2d 577 1 591 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing 
Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs' l 135 F. Supp.2d 409 1 417 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing legislative history of the CDA)). 
This grant of immunity applies only if the interactive 
computer service provider is not also an "information content 
provider" -- a person or entity who is "responsible I in whole or in 
IIpart I for the creation or development the complained-of 
content. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f) (3) i see also Ascentive, LLC v. Opinion 
Corp. I - F.Supp.2d 2011 WL 6181452 1 at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Dec.----I 
13 1 2011). "Case law ... suggests that one is responsible for the 
'development I of information when he engages in an act beyond the 
normal functions of a publisher (such as deciding to publishl 
withdraw or modify third-party content) that changes the meaning 
and purpose of the content. 1I Ascentive, LLC I 2011 WL 6181452 1 at 
*19 (emphasis added) (citing Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando 
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Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
Nonetheless, courts have routinely held that section 230 immunity 
should be broadly construed. See Atl. Recording Corp. v. project 
Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp.2d 690, 699-700 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(gathering cases) .22 
A website, such as ripoffreport.com, is considered to be an 
\\ interactive computer service" that falls wi thin the potential 
scope of section 230 immunity. See Ascentive, LLC, 2011 WL 6181452, 
at *18 (citing cases) i Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 
17 N.Y.3d 281, 290, 952 N.E.2d lOll, 1018 (2011) i see Doe v. 
City of N.Y., 583 F. Supp.2d 444, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). In addition, 
webs operators such as Magedson are considered to be providers 
of interactive computer services and thus may also be granted 
section 230 immunity. See, ~, Ascentive, LLC, 2011 WL 6181452, 
at *18. 
22 Some courts engage in a three-part inquiry when determining 
whether a party is entitled to CDA immunity: (1) whether 
defendant is a provider of an interactive computer service; (2) 
whether the postings at issue were provided by another 
information content provider; and (3) whether plaintiff seeks to 
treat defendants as a publisher or speaker of third-party 
content. See Gibson v. Craigslist. Inc., 2009 WL 1704355, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009) (quoting Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. 
Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 564 F. Supp.2d 544, 548 (E.D. Va. 
2008)) . 
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A. Defamation Claims 
In this case, it is undisputed that defendants did not create 
the content to which plaintiff objects -- the allegedly defamatory 
posts. Instead, as discussed above, those posts were written and 
submitted by one or more website users. (See Am. Compl. ~ 8). In 
fact, Seldon does not allege that Magedson created or altered any 
of the allegedly defamatory posts other than by choosing their 
ti tIes. (Id. ~ 9). We therefore must determine whether that 
behavior amounts to the development of defamatory content such as 
to preclude CDA immunity for defendants. 
The headings that defendants allegedly created for the 
offending posts did not alter the substance, meaning, or purpose of 
their underlying content. The first post was titled "Sexual 
Pervert," and it detailed how Seldon had allegedly kept "all kinds 
of perverted photos on his computer ll and taken "nasty photos" of 
the complaining poster "when he got [her] drunk. II (Am. Compl. ~ 
18). The second post had no tit (Id. ~ 25). The third post was 
titled "Tax Free Money Income,1I which alone cannot be said to be a 
defamatory statement regarding Seldon. The accompanying post 
detailed Seldon's alleged tax fraud. ~ 32). The fourth post 
was titled "Philip Seldon Vindictive Harassment,1I and it detailed 
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Seldon's alleged harassment of an individual based on his ex­
roommate's refusal to have sex with him. (Id. ~ 39). Finally, the 
last post was titled "Philip Seldon," which is not in and of itself 
defamatory. (Id. ~ 46) . 
Even if defendants did provide the above-mentioned titles for 
the of ive posts, such behavior -- which did not alter the body 
of the posts -- is irly said to be an editorial function and 
would not render defendants "information content providers" who 
played a substantive role in creating or developing the fending 
content. Ascentive, LLC, 2011 WL 6181452, at *21 (quoting Zeran 
v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997)) (CDA bars 
lawsuits that attempt to hold internet service providers liable for 
liable the "exercise of . publisher[s'] traditional editorial 
functions such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, 
postpone or alter content"); Asia Econ. Inst. v. Xcentric Ventures 
LLC, 2011 WL 2469822, at *5-7 (C.D. Cal. May, 4,2011) (finding 
that ripoffreport. com was not an "information content provider" 
even though it aided users in creating titles to their online 
posts) i cf. Roommates. Com, LLC, 521 F. 3d at 1169 (discussing 
meaning "development" under CDA section 230 i court explains that 
a "website operator who edits user-created content -- such as by 
correcting spelling, removing obscenity or trimming for length 
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retains his immunity for any illegality in the user-created 
content, provided that the edits are unrelated to the illegality 
[but that] a website operator who edits in a manner that 
contributes to the alleged illegality such as by removing the 
word 'not' from a user's message reading' [Name] did not s the 
artwork' in order to transform an innocent message into a libelous 
one -- is directly involved in the alleged illegality and thus not 
immune."); Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 17 N.Y.3d 
281, 292, 929 N.Y.S.2d 19, 27 (2011) (defendant website operators 
who created heading for reposted content "appear [ed] to have been" 
"content providers" under CDA with respect to that aspect of the 
post) . 
Seldon also alleges that defendants decide whether to post 
user-submitted reviews and whether to modify them by redacting 
defamatory content. (See Pl.'s Affirmation ~ 7; Am. Compl. ~ 6). 
Even if Magedson exercised his discretion in choosing which posts 
to make available on the website and in editing posts for 
defamatory content, such decisions would properly be within his 
purview as a website publisher as long as he was not altering the 
underlying meaning or purpose of the posts' content. See, ~, 
Ascentive, LLC, 2011 WL 6181452, at *21 (a webs that alters the 
display of third-party postings does not develop content for 
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section 230 purposes); Murawski, 514 F. Supp.2d at 591 (quoting 
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330) (a lawsuit seeking to hold service provider 
liable for deciding whether to publish or alter third-party content 
is barred by the CDA). In any event, Seldon does not allege that 
Magedson censored the posts that had been made about him 
instead, Seldon objects to Magedson's alleged failure to alter or 
restrict access to the offending posts. (See Am. Compl. , 8). 
Based on the foregoing, CDA immunity applies to all of 
plaintiff's defamation claims against defendants, and we therefore 
recommend that those claims be dismissed. See, ~, Ascentive, 
LLC, 2011 WL 6181452, at *19-21 (CDA immunity can apply even if 
defendants encouraged negative postings and manipulated order and 
availability of posts) i Asia Econ. Inst., 2011 WL 2469822, at *7. 23 
B. The Contract Claim 
To the extent that plaintiff attempts to hold defendants 
liable for their failure to perform under the alleged oral 
23 A number of other courts have also found that similar state-law 
claims, including defamation claims, against Xcentric and 
Magedson were barred by CDA section 230. See, ~, Asia Econ. 
Inst., 2011 WL 2469822, at *5-7 (citing, inter , GW Equity, 
LLC v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 2009 WL 62173 (N.D. Tex. 2009) i 
Intellect Art Multimedia, Inc. v. Milewski, 2009 WL 2915273 (Sup. 
Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Sept. II, 2009». 
53 
Case 1:11-cv-06218-PAC -MHD   Document 15    Filed 07/10/12   Page 53 of 64
contracts by not blocking, screening, or otherwise restricting 
public access to the defamatory postings (~Am. Compl. ~~ 8 1 53) 1 
that claim is also barred by CDA section 230. , ~, Gibson, 
2009 WL 1704355, at *4 (citing cases). The decision whether to 
restrict or remove content falls squarely within a website 
operator's exercise of a publisher's traditional role and is 
therefore subject to the CDA's broad immunity, even where the 
website operator has otherwise agreed to rest ct or remove 
content. 24 See, , Murawski, 514 F. Supp.2d at 591 (citing, inter 
alia, Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330) CDA immunized website from 
liability for failing to remove defamatory third-party content even 
though website had allegedly agreed to do so) i see Barnes v. 
Yahoo!! Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2009) (CDA barred 
negligent-undertaking claim against website that had allegedly 
agreed to remove defamatory content and failed to do so) .25 
24 It is also for this reason that the CDA shields defendants from 
liability for "edit[ing] and remov[ing]/I content for a under 
the CAP. (See Pl.'s firmation ~ 7; Am. Compl. ~ 7). 
25 CDA immunity applies even if, as alleged, Magedson "had 
knowledge that the defamatory material about [Seldon] on 
ripoffreport.com was se./I (Am. Compl. ~ 8) i see Atl. Recording 
Corp., 603 F. Supp.2d at 700 (discussing broad scope of CDA 
immunity, court referenced First Circuit's ision in 
Commc'ns Sys.! Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007)i 
Lycos court held that website operator's awareness of defamatory 
posts was insufficient to overcome section 230 immunity) i Global 
Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp.2d 929 (D. 
Ariz. 2008) (website-operator liability based on notice of 
defamatory posting has been rejected under CDA) . 
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Based on the foregoing, we recommend that the part of 
plaintiff's contract claim seeking relief for defendants' failure 
to remove or restrict access to the allegedly defamatory posts be 
dismissed as barred under CDA section 230. 
III. Plaintiff's Remaining Breach-of-Contract Claim 
Defendants argue that the remaining contract claim is either 
barred by New York's Statute of Frauds, General Obligations Law § 
5-701, or should be dismissed under Rule 12(b) (1) for plaintiff's 
failure to establish subject-matter jurisdiction over that claim. 
Plaintiff asserts that the Statute of Frauds does not bar his 
claim. 
The portion of plaintiff's contract claim that is not barred 
by the CDA alleges that defendants agreed to "provide advertising 
for various companies with which [plaintiff] was affiliated in 
exchange for websites that [he] was not using. 11 It does not concern 
the removal of the allegedly defamatory posts. (Am. Compl. ~ 53i 
.'s Affirmation ~ 8).26 
26 The full text of the breach-of-contract claim is as follows: 
"On August 24, 2011 the defendants entered into an agreement with 
Philip Seldon in which they agreed to make the aforecited 
postings the First through Sixth Causes of Action 
unsearchable, to insure [sic] that any future postings about 
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Under New York law, the elements of a breach-of-contract claim 
"include the existence of a contract, the plaintiff's performance 
thereunder, the defendant's breach thereof, and resul ting damages." 
~, Harris v. Seward Park Hous. Corp., 79 A.D.3d 425, 426, 913 
N.Y.S.2d 161, 162 (1st Dep't 2010). Although a plaintiff does not 
need to plead each element individually, "a claim that fails 'to 
allege facts sufficient to show that an enforceable contract 
existed' between the parties is subject to dismissal." Berman v. 
Sugo LLC, 580 F. Supp.2d 191, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting Banco 
Espirito Santo de Investimento, S.A. v. Citibank, N.A., 2003 WL 
23018888, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2003)). Conclusoryallegations 
that an agreement was breached cannot sustain a breach-of contract 
claim. Id. (citing Posner v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 713 F. Supp. 
562, 563-64 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); Window Headquarters, Inc. v. MAl Basic 
Four, Inc., 1993 WL 312899, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 1993)). 
In the present case, the amended complaint alleges that on 
August 24, 2011, Seldon and defendants entered into an agreement 
under which defendants agreed that they would make the allegedly 
Philip Seldon would not be published on ripoffreport.com and in 
addition to provide advertising for various companies with which 
Philip Seldon was affiliated in exchange for websites that Philip 
Seldon was not using. Defendants have refused to honor said 
agreement and have breached said agreement." (Am. Compl. ~~ 53­
54) . 
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defamatory posts unsearchable and prohibit future postings about 
him on ripoffreport.com. (Am. Compl. ~ 53). We have already found 
that part of Seldon's claim to be barred by the CDA. However, 
defendants also allegedly agreed on that same date to provide 
advertising on their website for various companies with which 
Seldon was affiliated in exchange for the use of webs domain 
names that Seldon presumably owned but was not using. 
Plaintiff alleges that defendants failed to perform this aspect of 
the agreement, 27 and requests speci c performance of the entire 
agreement. (Id. " 54-55). In addition, plaintiff also specifies in 
his irmation both the value of the consideration exchanged 
$150,000.00 for both the website domains and the advertising -- and 
the contract's duration less than one year. (See PI.' s 
Affirmation, 8).28 
27 Reading plaintiff's papers liberally, as we must, we infer that 
he means to allege that he performed his obligation of providing 
access to unused website domain names to defendants. Defendants 
do not argue that Seldon's pleading is inadequate in this 
respect. 
28 Because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, it is appropriate to 
consider factual assertions proffered in his oppos ion papers in 
addition to those in the complaint, at least to the extent that 
the two are consistent. See, ~, George v. Pathways to Housing, 
Inc., 2012 WL 2512964, at *6 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2012) (citing 
Shipman v. N.Y. State Office of Persons with Dev. Disabilities, 
2012 WL 897790, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2012) i 
824 F. 2d 192, 195 (2d Cir. 1987) (considering allegations 
contained in pro se plaintiff's affidavit submitted opposition 
to motion to dismiss». 
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Plaintiff's pleading and accompanying papers outline the 
essential terms of the contract, and thus state a plausible claim 
of contract breach. Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (a 
complaint is subject to dismissal unless its factual allegations, 
if credited, make the claim "plausible") i see al so, , Oberstein 
v. SunPower Corp., 2010 WL 1705868, at *5-7 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 
2010) (finding that pro se plaintiff's complaint survived Rule 
12(b) (6) motion to dismiss where complaint described the alleged 
agreement, identified the essential duties due by each party and 
alleged that defendant failed to perform its obligations) .29 
Defendants' arguments for dismissal of the remaining version 
of the contract claim are unpersuasive. First, the Statute of 
Frauds does not bar plaintiff's contract claim at this stage. Under 
New York's Statute of Frauds, an oral agreement is void if, by its 
terms, it cannot be performed within one year of its making or 
29 Although defendants argue that plaintiff failed to state a 
claim of breach of contract (see Defs.' Mot. 2 (stating that 
"each of the[] causes of action [that are barred by the CDAl fail 
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted [so those] 
claims should be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b) (6)")), they do not elaborate on that ground for dismissal 
with respect to the portion of plaintiff's contract claim that 
the CDA does not bar. (See id. at 14-17 (arguing only that 
remaining part of contract claim should be dismissed under New 
York Statute of Frauds and Rule 12(b) (1)). 
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before the end of a lifetime. N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-701(a) (1) .30 
An affirmative defense, such as the Statute of Frauds, may be 
raised by a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6) without resort to 
summary judgment proceedings only if the defense appears on the 
face of the complaint. , ~, S.E.C. v. Gabelli, 653 F.3d 49, 
60 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Harris v. City of N.Y., 186 F.3d 243, 
250 (2d Cir. 1999) (statute of-limitations defense)); Intuition 
Consolo Grp.t Inc. v. Dick Davis Publ'g Co., 2004 WL 594651, at *1 
n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2004); McCoy v. Goord, 255 F. Supp.2d 233, 
249 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 
152 F. 3d 67, 74-75 (2d Cir. 1998)) i see also 5B Charles Alan 
Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1357 (3d 
ed.2004) ("[T]he complaint also is subject to dismissal under Rule 
12(b) (6) when its allegations indicate the existence of an 
affirmative defense that will bar the award of any remedy; but for 
this to occur, the applicability of the defense has to be clearly 
indicated and must appear on the face of the pleading to be used as 
the basis for the motion. "). There is no indication in the 
30 Defendants focus on the one-year provision in asserting that 
dismissal is proper but also aver that the contract, as pled, has 
no end date. Thus we read their papers as also invoking the 
Statute of Frauds' lifetime provision. (See Defs.' Mot. 15 16 
(stating that contract claim is barred by Statute of Frauds 
because plaintiff did not "allege that the performance could be 
completed within a year" but so noting that "the advertising 
.. seems to have no end according to the allegation.")). 
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complaint that the contract could not possibly be performed within 
a year (or within a lifetime, cf. Horowitz v. Santamaria, 287 
A.D.2d 373, 373-74, 731 N.Y.S.2d 449, 450-51 (1st Dep't 2001)) ­
in fact, plaintiff asserts his affirmation that the duration of 
the contract was less than one year. See Chemtex, LLC v. St. 
Anthony Enters., Inc., 490 F. Supp.2d 536, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(ci ting, inter ~~, Marini v. D'Apolito, 162 A.D.2d 391, 392 93, 
557 N.Y.S.2d 45, 46 (1st Dep't 1990». Thus, dismissal at this 
stage based on the Statute of Frauds would be inappropriate. 
Defendants also argue that the contract claim should be 
dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b) (1) because plaintiff does not meet 
the amount-in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a) . 
Plaintiff asks for $150,000.00 in damages for defendants' alleged 
breach. While defendants argue that it is not reasonably probable 
that plaintiff's contract claim is worth in excess of $75,000.00 
(see Defs.' Mot. 16 17), "we recognize 'a rebuttable presumption 
that the face of the complaint is a good faith representation of 
the actual amount in controversy.' II Scherer v. Egui table Life 
Assur. Soc'y of the U.S., 347 F.3d 394, 397 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting 
Wolde-Meskel v. Vocational Instruction Project Cmty. Servs.! Inc., 
166 F.3d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 1999)). "To demonstrate a filing in bad 
faith, \ [i]t must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is 
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really for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify 
dismi , " for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See 
Wolde-Meskel, 166 F.3d at 63 (alteration in original) (quoting St. 
Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938)). 
Al though defendants argue that there is no logical 
justification for plaintiff's contract-damages request because they 
are not liable for any alleged failure to remove the offensive 
posts Defs.' Mot. 17), plaintiff could have been damaged by 
defendants' alleged failure to post Seldon's companies' 
advertisements on their website. (See Am. Compl. ~~ 53-54). 
Defendants have not met the "high bar" of successfully rebutting 
the presumption that plaintiff's demand is legitimate as they have 
not demonstrated "to a legal certainty" that the recoverable amount 
does not meet the jurisdictional minimum. See Scherer, 347 F.3d at 
397. 
Therefore, we recommend that the court deny defendants' motion 
to dismiss plaintiff's claim for breach of contract insofar as that 
claim is not barred by the CDA. 
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CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, we recommend that defendants' 
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction be granted. If 
the district court finds that the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
over defendants is proper, we recommend that the court grant 
defendants' motion to dismiss all six of plaintiff's defamation 
claims and the part of his contract claim that is barred by the CDA 
and deny defendants' motion to dismiss the remaining part of 
plaintiff's contract claim, which concerns website advertising. 
As for the nature the recommended dismissal, we note that 
"[i]t is the usual practice upon granting a motion to dismiss to 
allow leave to replead." Manswell v. United States, 2010 WL 
3219156, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2010) (citing Cortec Indus., Inc. 
v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42,48 (2d Cir. 1991)). Nonetheless, 
in this case, Seldon amended his complaint after receipt of 
defendants' motion to dismiss, and thus has been given the 
opportunity to reshape his pleadings in an effort to meet 
defendants' jurisdictional defense. Since his revised pleading, 
accompanied by his evidentiary proffer, fails to justify the 
exercise of jurisdiction by this court, there is no justification 
to invite still another effort on his part. As for the alternative 
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ground for dismissal under the CDA/ since the statute imposes 
immunity on the cited claims/ dismissal with prejudice is mandated. 
Pursuant to Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure/ 
the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from this date to file 
written objections to this Report and Recommendation. Such 
objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court and served on 
all adversaries/ with extra copies to be delivered to the chambers 
of the Honorable Paul A. Crotty/ Room 735/ 500 Pearl Street, New 
York, New York/ 10007-1312. Failure to file timely objections may 
constitute a waiver of those objections both in the strict Court 
and on later appeal to the United States Court of Appeals. See 28 
U.S.C. § 636 (b) (1) i Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 72, 6(a) / 6(e) i Thomas v. 
Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985) i DeLeon v. Strack, 234 F.3d 84, 86 (2d. 
Cir. 2000) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs./ 892 
F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989)). 
Dated: New York, New York 
July 9, 2012 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
-., 
MICHAEL H. DOLINGER 
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 
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Copies of this Report & Recommendation are being mailed today to: 
Mr. Philip Seldon 

500 E 77th Street 

New York, NY 10162 

Maria Crimi Speth, Esq. 

Jaburg & Wilk, P.C. 

3200 N. Central, Suite 2000 

Phoenix, AZ 85012 
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